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THE DOCTRINES OF LACK OF CONSENT AND LACK
OF INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL PROCEDURES
IN LOUISIANA
Gary L. Boland*

It is generally accepted that the average patient does not know much
about medicine. This ignorance is important in a medical malpractice cause
of action when the patient asserts that he has not been informed of (or
did not understand enough about) the risks, benefits, or costs of the particular procedure or treatment to have given the physician permission to
proceed with the procedure or treatment.
This article will examine the elements of the causes of action involving patient consent in the light of three recent Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions,' Louisiana statutory provisions,' and jurisprudence from other
jurisdictions.' The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decisions addressed
many of the problems raised by the causation element in lack of consent
or informed consent cases, as well as the question of whether a patient's
lack of consent provides a different cause of action from that for medical
malpractice. And while some problems are answered in title 40 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes, the answers to some of the remaining questions involving patient consent require an examination of the jurisprudence
of other jurisdictions.
The doctrine of informed consent has generated considerable controversy in the courts, among legal scholars and attorneys, and within
the health care professions.' It also constitutes one of the primary sources
of antagonism between doctors and lawyers, since the issue of informed
consent is most often raisedin the context of a lawsuit against the doctor
for medical negligence.' A patient who has suffered an undesired result

Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
* Member of Oklahoma and Louisiana Bar Associations and Director of the Center
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1. Gunter v. Plauche, 439 So. 2d 437 (La. 1983); Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d
859 (La. 1983); LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983) (Dennis, J., concurring,
437 So. 2d 869).
2. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 15-142 and accompanying text.
4. Comment, Patient Consent in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 1166 (1981).
5. J. Ludlam, Informed Consent 6 (1978).
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of treatment and is unable to prove that his doctor was negligent can
also seek relief on a different basis of liability-lack of informed consent. 6
An allegation of a lack of informed consent will not only fortify a weak
case of medical negligence, it will also guarantee the plaintiff that his
case will reach the jury.7 As a result, it is hardly surprising that the percentage of malpractice suits alleging a lack of informed consent is increasing.'
It has been suggested that the doctrine of informed consent requiring
that a patient must be provided with pertinent information regarding the
course of his medical and surgical treatment was born of a change in
society's attitude toward the doctor-patient relationship. 9 The patient is
no longer viewed as a passive entity within the paternalistic medical system
of "doctor knows best."'" Today, the patient is viewed as having the
right to determine the direction of his medical treatment and to base his
decisions on accurate information supplied by his doctor. In response to
the patient's need for accurate information so that he may be an informed
participant in the medical decision-making process, the legal system has
developed the concept of informed consent.'
In 1983 the Louisiana Supreme Court decided three informed consent cases.' 2 These were the first patient consent cases decided by the court
since 1917.'" The Louisiana Supreme Court, in applying Louisiana law
in many informed consent cases, has relied on decisions from other
jurisdictions and doctrinal literature.' A review of the pivotal cases from

6. Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance
between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 413.
7. J. Ludlam, supra note 5, at 6-7.
8. Karlson & Erwin, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent to the Locality Rule,
12 Ind. L. Rev. 653, 653 (1979). ("[T]here is a great probability that malpractice suits will
increase as patients become more aware of legal remedies. Two legal doctrines, res ipsa
loquitur and informed consent, are regarded by the medical profession as the legal foundation for the expansion in malpractice liability.").
9. Maldonado, Strict Liability and Informed Consent: "Don't Say I Didn't Tell You
So!", 9 Akron L. Rev. 609, 611-13 (1976).
10. Id.
11. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
12. See cases cited supra note 1.
13. Theodore v. Ellis, 141 La. 709, 75 So. 655 (1917).
14. See, e.g., Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d at 862 (citing Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); 1 F. Harper & F. James,
The Law of Torts §§ 3.1-3.3 (1956)); LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. "1983) (citing
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S.Ct.
560 (1972); Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 479 n.7 (5th Cir. 1943); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.
3d 229, 239-40, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511-12 (1972); Salgo v. Stanford Univ.,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 403-404,
350 P.2d 1093, 1101-02 (1960); Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289,
1298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (quoting Trogun v. Fructman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d
297 (1973)); State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889); McGuire v. Rix, 118
Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120, 123 (1929); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754
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other jurisdictions from which the issues involving informed consent cases
have evolved is therefore appropriate in order to better understand the
principles recently enunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
EVOLUTION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

Development of the Lack of Consent or Battery Concept in Medical
Malpractice Jurisprudence
One of the earliest reported cases in which a physician was sued by
a patient who claimed she had never consented to treatment was based
on the tort of battery.'" Anna Mohr went to Dr. Williams, the defendant, who diagnosed a serious disease in her right ear. He did not suggest that there was anything wrong with her left ear. After Mrs. Mohr
was anesthetized, Dr. Williams examined both ears and discovered that
the left ear was more seriously diseased than the right. He decided to
operate upon the left ear while the patient was asleep rather than wake
her up, obtain permission to operate on the left ear, and then anesthetize
her again. The operation was a success. Mrs. Mohr, however, felt differently about the matter, and sued Dr. Williams on the theory of battery for an unauthorized touching. In Mohr, the defendant, Dr. Williams,
contended that assault and battery was not the proper cause of action
because of the "entire absence of any evidence tending to show an evil
intent.""' The defendant's position was that, since there was no evidence
that he was motivated by wrongful intent or was guilty of negligence,
there was no assault and battery. The court disagreed with his theory
of medical liability, and held that: "If the operation was performed without
plaintiff's consent, and the circumstances were not such as to justify its
performance without, it was wrongful; and, if it was wrongful, it was
unlawful."" The effect of this holding was that, even when the patient
was unable to consent, such as while under anesthesia, and the performance of a particular procedure would have been in a patient's best interest, the physician could not proceed without consent.

(1956); Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Cooper v. Roberts, 220
Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971); Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949);
Paulsen v. Gunderson, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935); Slater v. Baker & Stapleton,
95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767); A. Rosoff, Informed Consent 33-41 (1981); Capron,
Informed Consent, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 340, 404-18 (1974); McCoid, The Care Required
of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549, 586-90 (1959); Meisel, The Expansion of
Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed
Consent, 56 Neb. L. Rev. 51, 74-86 (1977); Victor, Informed Consent, 1981 Med. Trial
Technique Q. 138, 139-41); Gunter v. Plauche, 439 So. 2d at 440 (citing no foreign cases,
but citing LaCaze with approval).
15. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
16. Id. at 270, 104 N.W. at 16.
17. Id. at 271, 104 N.W. at 17.
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After Mohr, several other jurisdictions followed the court's ruling that
the nonconsensual treatment of a patient constituted a battery."' The landmark case that entrenched the principle in the jurisprudence of a majority of jurisdictions for the next forty-six years was Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hospitals,'9 written by Judge Cardozo while he was serving
on the Court of Appeals of New.York. The principle set forth in Schloendorff is generally regarded as the touchstone for the doctrine that it is
the patient's right to determine the fate of his body and life. This principle embodies a basic right to physical integrity which many authorities
have interpreted as being protected by the United States Constitution. The
physician's obligation in treatment is to save lives, but he must have the
patient's consent before proceeding unless an emergency exists and the
patient can not give consent. The following passage has been quoted in
almost every treatise or journal article on informed consent.
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely
negligence. It is trespass. Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent, commits an assault for which he is liable
in damages. Pratt v. Davis . . . Mohr v. Williams . . . . This
is true except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent can
be obtained. The fact that the wrong complained of here is trespass
rather than negligence, distinguishes this case from most of the
cases that have preceded it. In such circumstances the hospital's
exemption from liability can hardly rest upon implied waiver.
Relatively to this transaction, the plaintiff was a stranger. She
had never consented to become a patient for any purpose other
than an examination under ether. She had never waived the right
to recover damages for any wrong resulting from this operation,
for she had forbidden the operation. 2"
The early "battery principle" cases have a common thread which
distinguishes them from those cases involving a cause of action for
negligence. 2 ' In a battery cause of action, the procedure is performed
without prior disclosure by the physician to the patient of the nature of

18. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (affirming a judgment
for trespass to the person, i.e., battery); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913)
(holding that where plaintiff expressly refused to allow the physician to remove a bone
from her foot, his doing so anyway constituted an actionable battery).
19. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
20. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
21. See Plante [sic], An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 Fordham L. Rev. 639,
650 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Plant, Analysis].
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"that treatment," and the patient may actually be unaware that a procedure is going to be performed.2" In a negligence cause of action, the
nature of the particular treatment is explained to the patient, but possible
complications, risks of treatment, and alternatives are not disclosed.
The battery action, which is still a viable cause of action under certain circumstances, 3 was clarified and distinguished from the negligence
24
action by the California Supreme Court in 1972 in Cobbs v. Grant. The
court indicated the need to distinguish these theories of recovery by discussing whether liability for the failure to disclose "material information"
in informed consent cases should be based on a theory of battery or of
negligence.
The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances
when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has
not consented. When the patient gives permission to perform one
type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite
element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is
present. However, when the patient consents to certain treatment
and the doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed inherent complication with a low probability occurs, no intentional
deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in
obtaining consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to
disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action should
be pleaded in negligence.
When the battery theory of liability is used, the patient must prove that
the doctor's "touching" caused an injury, but the patient does not have
to prove a causal link between the doctor's failure to disclose information and the decision to undergo the procedure in question.
The Cobbs decision is still regarded as the most authoritative statement of the crucial elements necessary in the battery theory.
Development of the Concept of the Physician's Duty to Inform the
Patient of the Risks of Treatment.
The physician's duty to disclose the risks of medical procedures to
his patients was not a concern of the early consent cases as the courts
continued to develop and apply the battery theory to these situations. In
Salgo v. Stanford University, 6 the California Court of Appeals recognized for the first time that, not only was the patient's consent required,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
formed

See Keen v. Coleman, 67 Ga. App. 331, 20 S.E.2d 175 (1942).
See, e.g., Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d at 862-63 (La. 1983).
8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
Id. at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (1972).
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). See Comment, New Trends in InConsent, 54 Neb. L. Rev. 66, 68 (1975).
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but that this must be an informed consent. Thus, the doctor was under
a duty to disclose to his patient all facts necessary to enable the patient
to give an intelligent consent.
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form
the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the known
dangers of h procedure or operation in order to induce his pa27
tient's consent ....
The Salgo court also recognized the need for the physician to balance
the duty to disclose the information necessary for the patient to consent
intelligently to medical treatment against the duty to withhold other information that might jeopardize the patient's welfare.
The physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else
and this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes
must choose between two alternative courses of action. One is
to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical
procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result
in alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who
may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in
fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks
by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself.
The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be
employed consistent with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to
28
an informed consent.
The requirement that the physician's disclosure of the information
necessary for the patient to consent intelligently be tempered with his consideration of the patient's physical and mental condition was to become
known as the "therapeutic privilege," and is a defense to the lack of
informed consent. Later cases have attempted to clarify the circumstances
in which the "therapeutic privilege" may be invoked. 9 These include situations where disclosure will prevent a rational decision, cause psychological
damage to the patient,"0 or unduly upset or weaken an unstable patient.'

27. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Reptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
30.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 789.

31.

Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. at 628, 295 A.2d at 689.
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The only definite restriction is that a physician may not remain silent
merely because disclosure might induce a patient to refuse therapy which
the physician feels is essential to the patient's well-being. 2
Additional exceptions to the disclosure requirement include the absence
of any duty to disclose risks involved in a procedure when the risks are
in fact known to the patient due to a previous experience with the
procedure.33 Physicians are also not required to inform their patients of
dangers of which persons of average sophistication are likely to be aware."'
The Salgo court articulated the two competing considerations which are
integral parts of the doctrine of lack of informed consent: (1) the "duty"
on the part of the physician to disclose enough information to the patient
to form the basis of an intelligent consent;33 and (2) the physician's
therapeutic privilege to withhold potentially harmful information from the
patient.3 6
Not until Natanson v. Kline3 was the issue raised of whether the
physician's duty to disclose the risks that might result from a proposed
medical treatment should allow the patient to recover under a theory of
negligence. Mrs. Natanson, in her lawsuit against Dr. Kline for medical
malpractice based on negligence, alleged that Dr. Kline was negligent in
the administration of the therapy and in the failure to warn her that the
treatment involved great risk of bodily injury or death. 8 Citing Salgo,3 9
the court held that the physician was obligated to make a full disclosure
of the facts necessary to insure an "informed consent."" 0 The court further noted that the physician's duty of disclosure is limited to those
disclosures that a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the
same or similar circumstances.
How the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient in this difficult situation involves primarily a question of
medical judgment. So long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure
an informed consent, the physician's choice of plausible courses

32. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
33. Id. at 788; Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 329, 213 S.E.2d 571, 580 (1975)
(quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. at 627-28, 295 A.2d
at 689.
34. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778; Butler, 25 N.C. App. at 342, 213 S.E.2d at 582;
Wilkinson, 110 R.I. at 627, 295 A.2d at 689.
35. Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
36. Id.
37. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960)
(cobalt radiation treatment for breast cancer resulting in severe injury to the skin, cartilage,
and bone of the plaintiff's chest wall).
38. 186 Kan. at 400, 350 P.2d at 1099.
39. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
40. 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106.
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should not be called into question if it appears, all circumstances
considered, that the physician was motivated only by the patient's
best therapeutic interests and he proceeded as competent medical
men Would have done in a similar situation.'
In its opinion denying a rehearing, the court adopted what might be
termed the "locality rule" of disclosure; it requires the plaintiff to produce expert testimony bearing on whether the disclosure was in accordance with "that of a reasonable medical practitioner under the same or
similar circumstances.""2 The court also stated that a physician has a legal
duty to make a reasonable disclosure to his patient "as a matter of law." 3
Two days after the issuance of the first Natanson opinion, the Supreme
Court of Missouri dealt with the same informed consent issue in Mitchell
v. Robinson." In Mitchell, the court recognized a duty on the part of
a physician to advise the patient of the collateral hazards (side effects)
of a proposed medical treatment. Since the plaintiff claimed that the physician had not informed him of the risks inherent in the treatment, the
court held that the question of whether the hazards of the therapy had
been explained was a question of fact for the jury. The court cited Mohr 5
and an article in the Minnesota Law Review "6 as authority for the existence of a "duty" of a physician to make a reasonable disclosure of
the hazards of a particular procedure.4 7 The court also determined that,
since this case involved a fact issue to be presented to a jury, no expert
medical testimony was needed.41
[C]onsidering the nature of Mitchell's illness and this rather new
and radical procedure with its rather high incidence of serious
and permanent injuries not connected with the illness, the doctors owed their patient in possession of his faculties the duty to
inform him generally of the possible serious collateral hazards;
and in the detailed circumstances there was a submissible fact issue
of whether the doctors were negligent in failing to inform him
4 9
of the dangers of shock therapy.
Professor Plant in an article written in 19681o characterized Natanson
41. Id.
42. 187 Kan. at 187, 354 P.2d at 671.
43. Id. at 189, 354 P.2d at 673.
44. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960) (Patient under insulin shock treatment fractured vertebrae
in convulsive reaction, a risk undisclosed by the physician.).
45. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
46. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 Minn.
L. Rev. 381 (1957).
47. 334 S.W.2d at 15. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
48. Id.at 16.
49. Id.at 19.
50. Plant, Analysis, supra note 21, at 648. Professor Plant attributes the erroneous
impression that a new cause of action was created to several writers' misinterpretations of
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and Mitchell as being interpreted by lawyers as a new cause of action.
Other writers have traced the beginning of "informed consent" claims
to the combined legal effect of the Mitchell and Natanson decisions because

after those decisions were published the frequency with which "informed
consent issues" have been litigated has increased both in number and in

relation to nearly every other issue litigated in malpractice actions.',
The Quality or Standards of the Disclosure
Once the courts recognized the existence of the physician's duty to
inform the patient of the risks of the medical procedure, the difficult
problem of how much information to disclose to the patient remained.
At first the courts followed Salgo and required full disclosure, 2 but objections were soon made that full disclosure of all risks was too burdensome for physicians and too anxiety-producing for patients. 3 The courts
developed three standards of disclosure: (1) the professional standard; (2)
the materiality or objective standard (also known as the reasonable man

view); and (3) the subjective standard.
The Professional Standard
The professional standard of due care is based on the custom of a
profession." This standard has been expressed in many different ways,"
but it commonly requires first, that compliance with custom be sufficient

to avoid liability 6 and second, that the plaintiff establish his case through

expert testimony. 7 Although custom is usually not a defense in a negligence
action," the medical profession enjoys the privilege of adopting its own
custom as a standard of due care. 9 This privilege is justified as supplying
both Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), and McCoid, supra note
46, as well as to a misleading American Law Report annotation, Annot., 79 A.L.R. 2d
1028 (1961).
51. Plant, Analysis, supra note 21, at 647-48.
52. Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
53. See, e.g., Woods v. Brunlop, 71 N.M. 221, 228, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (1962), overruled, Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 411, 589 P.2d 180, 195 (1978) (replacing the "full
disclosure" standard with a "subjective standard"); cf. Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153,
159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964) (refusing to adopt the "extreme" disclosure standard of
Salgo), modified on other grounds, McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 273, 287 S.E.2d
892, 897 (1982) (holding that plaintiff may testify that he would have refused treatment
if informed).
54. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 32 (3d ed. 1964); McCoid, supra
note 14, at 606.
55. McCoid, supra note 14, at 558-59.
56. Lambert, Malpractice Liability Concepts Affecting All Professions, in Medical
Malpractice-the ATL Seminar 7 (L. Harolds & M. Block eds. 1966).
57. McCoid, supra note 14, at 606.
58. Lambert, supra note 56, at 7.
59. Id. at 9.
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the only workable test 6' to apply to medical care cases since, in this area,
the lay person is considered incapable of evaluating a doctor's conduct
and because the courts want to allow doctors a great deal of discretion. 6 '
because lay people presumably are not familiar
Expert testimony is required
62
with medical custom.
The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the position exemplified
by the 1974 holding of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Karp v. Colley.63 The Karp rule "compels a physician to disclose facts
which a reasonable medical practitioner in a similar community and of
the same school of medical thought would have disclosed regarding proposed treatment." 6" Karp makes clear that "only doctors are competent
to testify about medical customs," 6' and therefore requires the plaintiff
in an informed consent medical malpractice case to introduce expert
testimony to show that the physician had a duty to disclose. Therefore,
in the states which adhere to the Karp test, a plaintiff must show, not
only that the physician defendant failed to inform him of the nature or
hazards of the procedure,66 but also that the physician deviated from the
67
disclosure practices of other physicians in the same or similar locality.
The Objective or Reasonable Man View
A minority of jurisdictions has adopted the objective or reasonable
man view that a physician's duty to disclose is measured by the average
or reasonable patient's need for information relevant to his decision of
whether to accept the proposed treatment. 6 This approach places emphasis
upon the perceptions of patients rather than upon those of the medical
community. The first court to adopt this reasoning was the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Canterbury v. Spence.69 The
majority in Canterbury held that the law, not medical custom, must define
the standard of disclosure and that the standard should be based on what
the patient needs to know in order to make an informed decision.70 Respect
for the patient's right of self-determination demands an external standard

60. McCoid, supra note 14, at 607-08.
61. Id.
62. E.g., Decho v. Shutkin, 144 Conn. 102, 106, 127 A.2d 618, 620 (1956).
63. 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 419.
65. Id.
66. Gravis v. Physicians and Surgeons Hosp., 415 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 427 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968).
67. D. Warren, Problems in Hospital Law 126 (3d ed. 1978). See also Anderson v.
Hooker, 420 S.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
68. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 783-85.
69. Id.at 776.
70. Id.at 786-87.
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set by law for physicians rather than a standard over which physicians
have complete control." The court, however, rejected a subjective standard requiring disclosure of those risks which the particular patient would
have deemed significant. 2 Instead, the court adopted an objective standard requiring disclosure whenever "a reasonable person in the patient's
position" would have attached significance to the risk in deciding whether
to consent to the proposed procedure. 3 Under the objective standard,
expert witnesses are unnecessary to show the materiality of risks to a patient's decision." The elimination of the need for expert testimony to
establish whether a risk should have been disclosed makes the materiality
standard a much more favorable one for plaintiffs than is the professional standard." Furthermore, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of
supplying expert testimony,' and the jury decides whether the physician's
disclosure was adequate for a reasonable person's informed consent."
The Subjective Standard
Another minority view is the subjective standard, illustrated by Scott
v. Bradford,' a 1979 Oklahoma Supreme Court decision. Rejecting the
medical paternalism of Karp jurisdictions and refusing to apply the
reasonable man view of the Canterbury jurisdictions, the Scott court
adopted a full disclosure standard.7 '9 Hence, under Scott the finder of fact
determines what risks were material to the particular patient's treatment
decision.80 The question to be answered by the jury is whether this patient wanted to undergo this operation and, if he had known of the risk
of the procedure, whether he would have consented to it. Therefore, the
focus of the subjective standard is the testimony of the patient as to
whether he would have undergone the procedure. The need for expert
medical testimony is eliminated.
An expansion of patients' rights beyond those inherent in the doctrine of informed consent was articulated by the California Supreme Court

71. Id. at 784.
72. Id.at 787.
73. Id.
74. See Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. at 625-26, 295 A.2d at 688 (stating that either
side may still introduce expert testimony to explain difficult concepts).
75. See Bucklin, Informed Consent: Past, Present, and Future, in Legal Medicine Annual 1975, at 203, at 213 (C. Wecht ed. 1976).
76. The plaintiff often encounters significant problems in obtaining expert testimony
due to the "conspiracy of silence" among physicians. See infra text accompanying notes
97-109.
77. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 288, 522 P.2d 852, 864 (1974), aff'd, 85
Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
78. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
79. Id.at 558-59.
80. Id.at 558.
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in Truman v. Thomas and is known as "informed refusal or dissent." 8
While the Court ostensibly used the objective disclosure standard, it actually applied the subjective standard. In Truman the court determined
that a physician must supply a patient with all material information con-

cerning a proposed test before the patient can make a properly informed
decision of whether to submit to the proposed procedure. 2 The court
defined material information as that information which is not commonly
known and which would be "regarded as significant by a reasonable person in that patient's position." 83 Moreover, the duty to inform requires
the physician to determine and satisfy each patient's special needs for
information.8"
These guidelines apply equally to treatment and to disagnostic
procedures,85 regardless of whether the patient accepts the suggested
procedure. 86 Even if the test or the treatment itself is without risk, the
court imposed an obligation on the physician to describe "all material
risks" which a patient might assume in refusing to submit to a procedure. 7
The Truman court quoted four basic assumptions upon which the
Cobbs court had based the physician's duty to disclose information.
81. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
Mrs. Truman visited Dr. Thomas repeatedly from 1964 to 1969. Dr. Thomas frequently
advised her to have a Pap smear test which she refused. In 1969, another doctor discovered
that she had a large cancerous tumor on her cervix. Mrs. Truman died of cervical cancer
in 1970 at the age of 30. Her two minor children brought an action for the wrongful death
of their mother- in which they contended that Dr. Thomas had breached a duty of care
to the decedent in failing to inform her of the risks of not consenting to a Pap smear.
The expert medical testimony established that if a Pap smear had been performed between
1964 and 1969, the cervical cancer would have been discovered. The trial court refused
to instruct the jury as follows:
[lit "is the duty of a physician to disclose to his patient all relevant information
to enable the patient to make an informed decision regarding the submission or
refusal to take a diagnostic test. [ ] Failure of the physician to disclose to his
patient all relevant information including the risks to the patient if the test is
refused renders the physician liable for any injury legally resulting from the patient's refusal to take the test if a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have refused the test if she had been adequately informed of all
of the significant perils."
Id. at 289-90, 611 P.2d at 904-05, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
82. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision in not requiring this instruction, but the California Supreme Court reversed and decided that Dr. Thomas's failure
to inform Mrs. Truman of the possible consequences of her refusal to submit to a diagnostic
test was a breach of his duty under the doctrine of informed consent.
83. Id. at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
84. Id. at 291, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312 ("If the physician knows or
should know of a patient's unique concerns or lack of familiarity with medical procedures,
this may expand the scope of required disclosure.").
85. Id. at 291, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
86. Id. at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
87. Id.
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The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the
medical sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may
safely assume the knowledge of patient and physcian are not in
parity. The second is that a person of adult years and in sound
mind has the right, in the exercise of control of his own body,
to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment. The third is that the patient's consent to treatment, to be
effective, must be an informed consent. And the fourth is that
the patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject
dependence upon and trust in his physician for the information
upon which he relies during the decisional process, thus raising
an obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length
transactions. 88
The court then applied these four basic assumptions to create a rule
defining the physician's duty to disclose. 9 Although Cobbs v. Grant involved consent to treatment, 9° the majority rejected Dr. Thomas's contention that, since Mrs. Truman rejected the recommended treatment, he
was exempt from the Cobbs duty. 9' The majority appeared to base its
rejection on the patient's right to exercise control over his body and to
decide whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment. 9 Dr. Thomas
further contended that he had no duty to disclose the risks of failing to
undergo the procedure (in this case a Pap smear) because the danger of
cancer was remote and commonly understood. But the majority also rejected this argument,93 stating that the circumstances of a particular case
may require disclosure even if there is no general duty to disclose. 94 The
Court reasoned that the "patient standard" for the physician's disclosure
created in Cobbs was sufficiently broad to include the facts of Truman.95
This use of the subjective test imposes a new duty on the physician to

88. Id. at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513).
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The careful physician
should inform the patient, not only of the risks inherent in the procedure, treatment, or
diagnostic test, but also of the risks of a decision not to undergo the procedure and if
the recommended procedure is risk free, of the probability of a successful outcome of the
treatment. On the other hand, if the recommended test or treatment presents any risk, then
the physician should always explain the potential consequences of declining to follow the
recommended course of action.
90. 8 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
91. 27 Cal. 3d at 292-93, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
92. "To now hold that patients who reject their physicians' advice have the burden
of inquiring as to the potential consequences of their decisions would be to contradict Cobbs."
Id.
93. 27 Cal. 3d at 293-94, 611 P.2d at 906-07, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
94. Id. at 294, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
95. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
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disclose to the patient the risks of refusing to submit to a simple diagnostic
test. 9" In previous case law, a physician only had the duty to warn the
patient of the risks involved in undergoing treatment or surgical procedure.
Under Truman, it is no longer necessary for the physician to actually
administer treatment to the patient to be held liable for failing to give
a full disclosure. The physician, as a fiduciary, has the obligation to provide to the patient all information material to that patient's decision to
accept or reject treatment. Truman, therefore, strengthens the patient's
right to decide for himself what will be done to his body, and imposes
a responsibility on the physician to communicate the material medical risks
to the patient in such a way that the patient is made to understand the
consequences of his acceptance or rejection of medical treatment. This
requirement should cause the physician to take more time with each patient. He will have to explain the procedure, and ask questions of the
patient, as well as answer the patient's questions, before he can be sure
that the patient understands his explanation and can give a valid informed consent.
Comparison of the Professional, Objective, and Subjective Standards;
Proof of Causation
Under Karp, Canterbury, and Scott the doctor's duty to disclose is
not contingent on the patient's request for information.97 All of these
cases hold that a physician, absent a privilege to withold information,
has an affirmative duty to disclose. There also seems to be a consensus
that the physician need not advise a patient of dangers of which he is
already aware, or of which the physician is unaware. 98 Additionally, the
doctor need not give the patient a mini-medical course, but only a
reasonable explanation "in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake: the
therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectedly to be achieved, and
the risks that may ensue from particular treatment and no treatment." 99
96. The majority opinion refers to this as an "additional duty" while the dissent calls
it a "new duty." 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 298, 611 P.2d at 906, 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312,
316. The court's suggestion that a physician may have a duty to disclose the consequences
of refusing a diagnostic test would seem to allow the physician to claim the therapeutic
privilege as a defense to a failure to disclose. But the therapeutic privilege is, by its nature,
inappropriate in the context of informed refusal. Where the patient has initially refused
a test, perhaps from ignorance of the possible consequences of refusal, the physician's
disclosure of these risks can only serve to increase the likelihood that the patient will eventually consent to the test. On the other hand, if the patient is unaware of an undiagnosed
illness and had already refused the diagnostic test, it is not likely that information relating
to the consequences of refusal would distress the patient.
97. But cf. Note, Malpractice: Toward a Viable Disclosure Standard for Informed Consent, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 868, 888 (1979).
98. There might, however, be a cause of action for failure to inform the patient of
what the physician should have known. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788.
99. Id. at 782 n.27,
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It should be recalled that under Truman, a physician has the duty to advise patients of all "material risks" that might develop if a common
diagnostic medical procedure is declined. The chief flaw of the Truman
decision is that it failed to establish disclosure guidelines applicable to
other common diagnostic procedures. As a result of this omission, courts
in future cases will have to apply the standard on a case-by-case basis.
Since the term "material risks" does not define precisely what information must be provided, prudent physicians will probably need to engage
in lectures explaining each test and establish a dialogue with each patient,
since the physicians' explanations may be evaluated in court. The dialogue
should be reduced to writing and made a part of the doctor's medical
records.
Although the cases agree that the burden of proving the physician's
breach of duty must be borne by the plaintiff, disagreement continues
over how the existence of that duty is to be proven in the courtroom.
In those jurisidictions following Karp, the physician's duty is proven by
the introduction of expert testimony'0 ° as to what a reasonable medical
doctor in a similar community and the same school of thought would
have disclosed.' 0 However, most jurisdictions following Canterbury, having
dispensed with the need for expert medical testimony, measure the duty
by determining what the average reasonable patient would have deemed
material to his treatment decision. Scott goes one step further than Canterbury's "reasonable patient" standard by measuring the physician's duty
of disclosure by the subjective understanding of the individual patient.
The physician must make full disclosure of all of the material risks incident to treatment. Truman goes one step further than Scott and requires
that the patient be told of the risks of refusing treatment. These cases
articulate no purely legal standard of materiality, leaving materiality as
a question of fact for the jury. Under this standard, when the materiality
of a particular risk is open to debate, the issue is for the finder of fact.' 2
Hence, the majority (i.e., professional) standard position is one that favors
the paternalistic beliefs that the doctor knows best and that good medicine
must, therefore, be good law. Accordingly, the standard of disclosure is
one set by the physicians themselves. On the other hand, the objective
and subjective minority positions are that respect for a patient's right of
self-determination demands a standard set by law. The objective minority
view favors the patient by letting the fact finder establish the standard
of duty by measuring the doctor's disclosure against what a reasonable
100. Comment, Standard of Care for Medical Practitioners: Abandonment of the Locality
Rule, 60 Ky. L.J. 209, 210 (1971). The disadvantages of this view to the plaintiff are exacerbated by the "conspiracy of silence" in which doctors are reluctant to testify against
one another.
101. See generally Note, supra note 97.
102. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 787.
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patient would have deemed material. The subjective position measures the
doctor's duty to disclose by what the individual patient would have deemed
material to his giving of consent. Briefly speaking, the three standards
can be characterized as being based on the perceptions of the physician
in a similar community of the same school of thought, or on the average
reasonable patient's material needs, or on the individual patient's needs.
Sometimes, a particular disclosure would be sufficient under any of
the three positions. A comparison of the respective standards indicates
that those jurisdictions that have adopted the Canterbury approach offer
the patient a greater opportunity to protect his right to self-determination
than do those which adhere to the majority approach. In short, the duty
to disclose can be sometimes higher under the rule of Canterbury than
under that of Karp. It should be noted that neither the Karp nor the
Canterbury test operates subjectively from the perspective of either the
physician or the patient, but objectively from the perspective of the physician in a similar community in the same school of thought or from the
perspective of the average reasonable patient and what information he
would deem to be material.' 3 Thus, even under the Canterbury rule, if
the plaintiff patient would not have undergone the therapy, would have
undergone alternative therapy, or would not have undergone therapy at
all, he could not prevail if the jury finds that an average reasonable patient would have decided otherwise.'"" Therefore, under the rule of Canterbury, an individual patient's right of self-determination is no greater than
that of the average patient. As a result, under both the Karp and Canterbury positions, there is no individual choice. This shortcoming is directly
addressed in the Scott and Truman approaches which specifically protect
and preserve the individual patient's freedom of choice.
Under all three standards (the professional, the objective or reasonable
man view, and the subjective), a plaintiff bringing an informed consent
negligence action must prove a causal connection between the physician's

103. The Canterbury rationale for not using the subjective standard is that
Such a requirement, however, would summon the physician to second-guess the
patient, whose ideas on materiality could hardly be known to the physician. That
would make an undue demand upon medical practitioners, whose conduct, like
that of others, is to be measured in terms of reasonableness. Consonantly with
orthodox negligence doctrine, the physician's liability for nondisclosure is to be
determined on the basis of foresight, not hindsight; no less than any other aspect
of negligence, the issue on nondisclosure must be approached from the viewpoint
of the reasonableness of the physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows
or should know to be the patient's informational needs. If, but only if, the fact
finder can say that the physician's communication was unreasonably inadequate
is an imposition of liability legally or morally justified.
Id.
104. Cf. Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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failure to inform and the subsequent injury." ' His proof of causation

must include two elements: demonstration that his injury resulted from
an unrevealed risk that should have been disclosed to him, ' and that
he would not have consented to the operation or treatment if he had
07
known of the risks.1

Customarily, courts have applied a subjective test in determining
whether a particular patient would have consented to the treatment had
he been adequately informed of the risk and alternatives. The more recent trend, however, is to use an objective approach' 8 and to consider
what a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would have
decided had adequate disclosure been made. 0 9 The medical profession

prefers the objective standard because it does not depend on the plaintiff's self-serving testimony as to what he would have decided if all of
the material risks had been disclosed, and because objective standard
testimony is easier for the defendant's expert medical witnesses to rebut

than is plaintiff's testimony under the subjective standard. On the other
hand, the subjective standard enables the jury to consider the patient's
individual circumstances, (his personal beliefs, his experiences, religion,
etc.) in deciding whether he would have made the same decision had the
physician adequately informed him of the risks of the procedure or

treatment.
Exceptions and Defenses to the Doctrine of Informed Consent and the
Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
Notwithstanding the doctrine of informed consent, situations occur
in which a physician will not be liable for administering treatment without
a patient's informed consent.' 1 The first exception arises when an emergency situation renders disclosure impractical."' This exception is invok105. Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 92 (Me. 1974).
106. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (1965), modified, 2
Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966) (This causal requirement is an application of the "but
for" rule "which comes as close to being of the essence of the proximate cause doctrine
as any concept.").
107. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. at 628-29, 295 A.2d at 690 (1972).
108. See, e.g., Reidinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (D. Idaho 1973); Sard
v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 450, 379 A.2d 1014, 1024-25 (1977); Fogal v. Genesse Hosp., 41
A.D.2d 468, 474, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 560 (1973); Small v. Gifford Mem. Hosp., 133 Vt.
552, 558, 349 A.2d 703, 707 (1975); Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 537, 512 P.2d 539,
550 (1973).
109. For a proposed standard of the scope of the physician's duty to inform the patient
of risks, see Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 548, 554-63 (1973).
110. See J. Ludlam, supra note 5, at 36. For an in-depth discussion of exceptions to
the duty to disclose, see Meisel, supra note 6.
111. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788; Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 309-10,
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ed when "the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting
and harm from a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm
threatened by the proposed treatment."''2 In this circumstance, the courts
will imply the patient's consent because they assume that a reasonable
person in the patient's position would have consented to treatment." '
A second exception is made for the physician's "therapeutic
privilege."''1 4 If the physician determines that full or even partial disclosure
is not in the patient's best interest, a well recognized privilege to withhold
the information arises." 5 In Watson v. Clutts, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a physician has two duties: to do what is best for his
patient and to make adequate disclosure." 6 The court held that in situations where these two duties conflict, the primary duty of doing what
is best for the patient must prevail.'"1 The impact of this rule is that the
therapeutic privilege can be quite broad and that, unless carefully limited,
it has the potential to swallow up the duty to disclose.' 8 Nevertheless,
in situations where either the emergency or the therapeutic privilege is
invoked, the physician should attempt to make disclosures to the relatives
of the patient.
Another exception has been developed for incompetent and minor patients whereby the patient's parent or legal guardian is given the authority to consent for the patient" 9 because a patient should not be deprived

of medical care due to his inability to make medical decisions.'

°

There

79 N.E. 562, 565 (1906); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 410, 432 P.2d 250, 254 (1967).
112. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788. For a discussion of the emergency exception in Louisiana, see infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
113. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 243-44, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514; Gravis
v. Physicians and Surgeons Hosp., 415 S.W.2d at 677-78.
114. The courts commonly consider four factors in their determination of whether a
doctor breached his duty to disclose: (1) the likelihood and gravity of adverse results; (2)
the frequency or percentage of cases in which such risk, harm or adverse result is seen;
(3) the probable effect of the procedure or treatment on the patient's health or well-being;
and (4)the probable effect of disclosure on the patient's mental health or well-being. See
generally Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. Rev. 1075 (1974);
and Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 (1970).
115. See Salgo v. Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
116. 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964), overruled, McPherson v. Ellis,
287 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. 1982) (adopting subjective standard of determining consent).
117. Id.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; Note, supra note 109, at 558; Kessenick
118. See, e.g.,
& Mankin, Medical Practice: The Right to be Informed, 8 U.S.F.L. Rev. 261, 276-77 (1976).
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
119. See, e.g.,
514. For a discussion of the Louisiana law regarding the consent of minors, incompetents,
and other persons who lack legal capacity to consent, see infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
120. See In re Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, 73 Misc. 2d 395, 398-99,
342 N.Y.S.2d 356, 360-61 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 623, 254
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are other exceptions to the disclosure requirement. For example, the courts
recognize a privilege of non-disclosure when an average patient would have
been aware of the risks, 12' when the physican was unaware of the risks
at the time disclosure was made,' 2 2 or when the patient has been made
aware of the possibility of harm, but has chosen to forego or waive the
disclosure of risks.' 3 Exceptions to the disclosure requirements are affirmative defenses which the defendant may utilize when he is being sued
under a theory of lack of informed consent.' 2
One of the problems which physicians face in light of the Truman
requirements of informed consent and informed refusal to treatment is
what to do with the patient who wants to die.' 25 It should be recalled
that, under Truman, the physician has a duty to inform the patient of
the risks which may occur if the patient refuses treatment. If the patient
still refuses treatment, it might be argued that the physician should wait
until an emergency exists and the patient is unconscious and then render
treatment to save life and limb under the emergency exception. In so doing, the physician may be overlooking the patient's constitutional right
to privacy' 26 and the patient's right to make an informed choice of whether
to submit to medical treatment.' 27 However, in Roe v. Wade, the United
States Supreme Court noted that "it is not clear to us that the . . .
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases [is included within]
the right to privacy.""'2 Although the Court noted that it had refused
to recognize this kind of unlimited right in the past, it did recognize a
qualified right to make a private and personal abortion decision.' 29
Although the United State Supreme Court has not yet established the limits

N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Meisel, supra note 6, at 439.
121. See Bucklin, supra note 75, at 212.
122. See Small v. Gifford Mem. Hosp., 133 Vt. at 557, 349 A.2d at 706; Scaria v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975).
123. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
124. Id.
125. The right is also known as the "right to die" or the right to "death with dignity."
See Comment, North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Confronting Death with Dignity, 14
Wake Forest L. Rev. 771 (1978); Death with Dignity: An Inquiry into Related Public Issues:
Hearings Before the Special Senate Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1972) (statement of Warren T. Reich, Senior Resident Scholar at the Kennedy Center for Bioethics,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.).
126. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), the Supreme Court stated
that although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, "In a line
of decisions the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152, 93 S.
Ct. at 726.
127. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
129. Id. Subsequent cases do not make it clear whether the right involved is truly the
right to decide or merely the right to have an abortion. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
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of this right to privacy,"' the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that
the right to decline medical treatment is included within this right."' The
constitutional status of the patient's right to determine whether to submit
to medical treatment is further supported by the patient's constitutional
right to exercise freedom of religion.' 32
If the patient's right to decide is fundamental and if the disclosure
is insufficient to provide the patient with adequate information to exercise effectively his right to decide, then an inadequate standard for
disclosure may unconstitutionally infringe the exercise of that right.' 33 Furthermore, the right to information may be included in the right to
privacy.' 3 Finally, a state's interest in withholding material information
with which a patient could make an intelligent and informed decision is
minimal.'3 5 Thus, the patient should be entitled as a matter of federal
constitutional law to sufficient material information to allow an intelligent
decision concerning his life and death. However, strict constitutional
analysis requires that there be some kind of state action before the protections of the United States Constitution be invoked.
THE LOUISIANA DOCTRINES OF LACK OF CONSENT AND LACK OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN MEDICAL PROCEDURES: JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATION

In LaCaze v. Collier,' 36 Pizzalotto v. Wilson,' 37 and Gunter v.
Plauche," the Louisiana Supreme Court thoroughly reviewed the historical
development of the doctrines of lack of consent and lack of informed
consent. (Recall that the lack of consent constitutes a battery and that
lack of informed consent is generally recognized as medical negligence.' 39 )
130. See generally Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159; Note, H.L. v. Matheson, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 867, 869 (1981).
131. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40-42, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976) (stating that the constitutional right of privacy is presumably "broad enough
to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances,
in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate
pregnancy under certain conditions"). Id. at 40, 335 A.2d at 663.
132. See Note, The Legal Aspects of the Right to Die: Before and After the Quinlan
Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823 (1977).
133. But cf. Meisel, supra note 6, at 446-47.
134. Cf. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 43, 84. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 67, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 (1976) (noting that "the decision to abort is an important
and often stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge
of its nature and consequences").
135. See Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 67, 74-77 (1979).
136. LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983) (Dennis, J., concurring, 437 So.
2d 869).
137. Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983).
138. Gunter v. Plauche, 439 So. 2d 437 (La. 1983).
139. Plant, Analysis, supra note 21, at 649-52; Note, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 1396, 1399-1401 (1967).
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Before these three cases were decided, the Louisiana Courts of Appeal
inconsistently applied the theories of recovery in both types of informed

consent cases.'

4'

Furthermore, the circuits were divided on the issue of

4
whether to use the objective or the subjective standard of causation.' '

Additionally, the courts of appeal had not determined whether the provisions of the Louisiana Uniform Consent Law' 2 constituted a binding
legislative determination of the physician's duty of disclosure.
Lack of Consent or Battery in Medical Malpractice
In Pizzalotto v. Wilson, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished
lack of informed consent from lack of consent and held that the lack
of consent on the part of a patient to a physician for a medical procedure is a battery. Dietrich Wilson, a twenty-seven-year-old single woman
went to Dr. Pizzalotto in September, 1978. Dr. Pizzalotto diagnosed her
140. See Comment, Patient Consent in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 1166 (1981).
141. Zachary v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971) (lack of informed consent); Carroll v. Chapman, 139 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962) (examples of lack of consent, battery); Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119
So. 2d 649 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960). The "subjective standard" of causation was utilized
in Bush v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 264 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 266 So. 2d 452 (La. 1972), and the "objective standard" of causation was
formulated in Goodwin v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 294 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 788 (La. 1974).
142. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977) provides:
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written consent to medical
treatment means a consent in writing to any medical or surgical procedure or
course of procedures which (a) sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose
of the procedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of death,
brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ
or limb, or disfiguring scars associated with such procedure or procedures, (b)
acknowledges that such disclosure of information has been made and that all questions asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in a satisfactory manner, and (c) is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is to be
performed, or if the patient for any reason lacks legal capacity to consent by
a person who has legal authority to consent on behalf of such patient in such
circumstances. Such consent shall be presumed to be valid and effective, in the
absence of proof that execution of the consent was induced by misrepresentation
of material facts.
B. Except as provided in Subsection A of this Section, no evidence shall be
admissible to modify or limit the authorization for performance of the procedure
or procedures set forth in such written consent.
C. Where consent to medical treatment from a patient, or from a person authorized by law to consent to medical treatment for such patient, is secured other
than in accordance with Subsection A above, the explanation to the patient or
to the person consenting for such patient shall include the matters set forth in
Paragraph (a) of Subsection A above, and an opportunity shall be afforded for
asking questions concerning the procedures to be performed which shall be answered
in a satisfactory manner. Such consent shall be valid and effective and is subject
to proof according to the rules of evidence in ordinary cases.
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condition as pelvic inflammatory disease (P.I.D.) and a potential adnexal
cyst or an endometrioma. Ms. Wilson read extensively about her condition to understand the nature of the tests and treatment prescribed. In
November she signed a consent to operate form which stated that sterility
might result from the operation. The procedure to which she consented
was a laparoscopy which Ms. Wilson knew did not cause sterility, so she
struck out and initialed the sterility warning. The procedure confirmed
the presence of P.I.D. and endometriosis.
Dr. Pizzalotto then recommended a laparotomy, an exploratory abdominal operation, but he did not discuss with Ms. Wilson the risk of
sterility from this operation or an alternative method of treatment. Also,
Dr. Pizzalatto did ask Ms. Wilson if she had any questions. Ms. Wilson
testified that since she understood the possible consequences of endometriosis, she did not ask any questions. The printed consent form provided that the doctor or his associate could do anything they considered
necessary, and indicated that sterility was a risk of this operation. Although
the consent form listed the procedure as "Dx (1) Pelvic inflammatory
disease, marked (2) endometroisis Rec (1) Laparotomy-Lysis of adhesions, Fulguration of endometrioma,"'' 3 on the hospital chart Dr. Pizzalatto wrote that a "probable salpingo-oophorectomy" (surgical removal
of the uterine tube and an ovary) would be performed."' Ms. Wilson,
however, was not informed of this notation; nor did she cross out the
sterility provision as she had done previously.
Dr. Pizzalatto commenced the procedure but during the course of
the operation found Ms. Wilson's condition to be worse than he had anticipated. Dr. Pizzalatto's assistant agreed with his findings, so without
attempting to obtain an informed consent from her or another qualified
person,4 ' Dr. Pizzalatto removed all of Ms. Wilson's reproductive organs
(a total hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy). When Ms.
Wilson learned what had happened in surgery, she refused to pay Dr.
Pizzalatto's bill. This refusal precipitated the litigation.
Ms. Wilson argued that she had not given her consent to the operation which was performed, and that the consent form which she had signed
was invalid because Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 requires that
the procedure to be performed be named and that the attendant risks
of the named procedure be discussed with the patient. In response, Dr.
Pizzalatto contended that the "blanket consent form" signed by Ms.
Wilson gave him the option of exercising his judgment in doing whatever
was necessary or advisable in the course of the operation and that it was
an implied consent to the procedure actually performed. He also argued

143.
144.
145.

437 So. 2d at 862.
Id.
Id. at 866 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
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that according to Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.54, whenever an
emergency exists in which the life or health of the person may be affected, a consent to surgery will be implied." 6
Justice Dennis, writing for the majority, found that the evidence adduced at trial indicated that a medical emergency as defined by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 40:1299.54 did not exist.'4 7 Turning to the consent form,
the court determined that the evidence did not support the contention
that the blanket consent language gave the physician either express or implied permission to remove the patient's reproductive organs, particularly
since the physician was aware of the patient's intent to have children in
the future. The operation was thus unauthorized, and therefore, a battery.
A surgeon commits a battery on his patient when he undertakes
a particular surgical procedure without the consent of the patient
or an authorized person, except when an emergency requires immediate surgery for the preservation of life or health under circumstances when such consent cannot be practicably obtained.
•..Though a battery is generally manifested as an act of hostility, the basis of this battery is not the hostile intent of the physician, but rather the absence of consent on the part of the patient
to a treatment that may in fact be beneficial.' 8
The majority concluded that although Ms. Wilson was not entitled
to recover damages for negligence or malpractice, an unauthorized operation that was skillfully performed nevertheless constituted a battery for
which she was entitled to recover damages.' 9 Justice Lemmon concurred
with reasons questioning the use of the term battery and the determination of the damages, but agreeing with the result. 5 '
Justice Marcus, in his dissent, concluded that a medical emergency
existed, and therefore, according to Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.54,
a consent to surgery should have been implied. He also stated that the
language in the consent form allowing the surgeon to do whatever in his
opinion was necessary gave him the discretion to remove the diseased
146. Id. at 867 (Marcus, J., dissenting); see also La. R.S. 40:1299.54 (Supp. 1984) (stating
that consent shall be implied where an emergency exists).
147.
[A]n emergency is defined as a situation wherein: (1) in competent medical judgment, the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures are reasonably
necessary; and (2) a person authorized to consent under Section 1299.53 is not
readily available, and any delay in treatment could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the life or health of the person affected, or could reasonably result in disfigurement or impair faculties.
La. R.S. 40:1299.54(A) (Supp. 1984).
148. 437 So. 2d at 862.
149. Id. at 865.
150. Telephone interview with Justice Lemmon (Oct. 14, 1983) (copy of Justice Lemmon's concurring opinion filed with Louisiana Law Review).
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organs. Because the decision to remove the diseased organs was concurred in by the assistant surgeon and the pathologist who examined the
organs after the surgery had been performed, Justice Marcus found that
the language in the consent form allowing the surgeon to exercise his
medical judgment permitted the removal of the organs. '
Justice Blanche, in his dissent, also found that the removal of the
organs was properly within the medical judgment of the physician and
in the best interest of the patient since both of her ovaries were destroyed
by disease and her fallopian tubes were completely blocked by adhesions.
He concluded that "[flailure to remove them would have been a 'marked
breach of competence' ",..2 and observed that "[a]lthough not relevant
to the case before us, this writer wonders which way the sword would
have swung had the doctor subjected plaintiff to another operation which
may either have caused her serious pain and suffering or possibly loss
of life.'' 53
Lack of Informed Consent
Pizzalotto was decided by the Court on September 2, 1983. Lacaze
v. Collier was decided June 17, 1983 with concurring opinions published
July 8, 1983 and September 26, 1983 by Justices Blanche and Dennis
respectively. Although the facts of the two cases are quite similar, it should
be noted that the court distinguished them, deciding them on two entirely
different theories of recovery. The patient in Pizzalotto recovered under
the "lack of consent-battery theory" as first set out in Mohr."4 The court
in LaCaze, applying the objective or reasonable man causation standard
of Canterbury,55 denied the plaintiff's claim which was grounded in the
theory of lack of informed consent.
In LaCaze the female patient visited Dr. Collier on a regular basis
from 1972 to 1977. On each visit Dr. Collier diagnosed pelvic inflamatory
disease (P.I.D.), a general inflammation of the tissues and organs of the
pelvic area due to infection. On the first visit Dr. Collier recommended
a hysterectomy and continued to so recommend on each subsequent visit
although he did unsuccessfully treat Mrs. LaCaze with antibiotics.
On June 11, 1977, Mrs. LaCaze called Dr. Collier and agreed to have
the recommended surgery. Upon admission to the hospital, she signed
two separate consent forms, neither of which gave any details of the
surgery or related risks. The first form contained the names of the doctor
and patient, the date and time, the witness' signature and a statement
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

437 So. 2d at 866-67.
Id. at 868.
Id.
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
474 F.2d at 784-87.
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that the possible complications of the "above-named treatment" had been
explained by 1r. Collier. The "above-named treatment" was never listed.' 56
The first form was signed by Mrs. LaCaze at 2:50 P.M. on June 13, 1977.
At 5:00 P.m. that same day Mrs. LaCaze signed the second form which
was a consent for a total abdominal hysterectomy. The form did not list
any risks of the procedure nor did it acknowledge that the physician had
disclosed any of the risks to the patient.
On June 14, the surgery was performed without incident, although
complications soon arose which kept Mrs. LaCaze in the hospital for more
than a month after the surgery. She saw Dr. Collier for a urinary problem two times after she left the hospital. On her own initiative, the patient consulted a urologist who diagnosed her condition as a vesico-vaginal
fistula.' 57 On August 23, 1977, the urologist performed surgery on Mrs.
LaCaze which corrected her urinary problem.
Mrs. LaCaze filed suit against Dr. Collier alleging lack of informed
consent and surgical negligence in causing the vesico-vaginal fistula. The
trial judge dismissed Mrs. LaCaze's cause of action for damages and the
court of appeal affirmed that decision.' 8 The Louisiana Supreme Court
granted writs to determine whether Dr. Collier had secured a valid informed consent to the operation from Mrs. LaCaze.
Mrs. LaCaze argued that Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40, the
Uniform Consent Law, created a duty on the part of the doctor to inform the patient of the known risks of the procedure. She further averred that a failure to meet this duty supported an action in negligence.
Mrs. LaCaze also contended that Dr. Collier's failure to meet with her
for a preoperative conference to answer questions concerning the procedure
gave her an action in strict liability. The latter argument was presumably
based on the belief that the Uniform Consent Law is a statutory standard
for the form and substance of a valid informed consent, and that, if the
requirements of the statute are not met, a breach of duty on the part
of the physician should be implied. The court did not address this problem.

156.
157.

434 So. 2d at 1047.

A fistula is an abnormal opening between two organs of the body, in this case
between the bladder and vagina. Medical evidence presented indicated that the
usual cause of a vesico-vaginal fistula forming is a stitch that may be advertently
taken into the bladder during the closing of the vaginal cuff. In time, the stitch
would pull through the bladder wall. Other possible causes are nicking the bladder with the knife or damaging the blood supply to a portion of the bladder
wall with a blunt instrument or clamp. Vesico-vaginal fistulae typically measure
only a few millimeters in size, and, once formed, retain their initial size until
corrected.
Id. at 1041 n.2.
158. Lacaze v. Collier, 416 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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Dr. Collier, the defendant, argued that the Uniform Consent Law
is an evidentiary rule and does not change the substantive law."' He contended that adherance to the provisions of the statute merely creates a
presumption of a valid informed consent, but that the statute does not
create a duty on the part of the physician to follow those provisions.
Thus, he claimed the statute provides protection for the physician, but
does not provide any rights to the patient. If the doctor chooses not to
make use of the statute, then the question of whether the patient has
consented to the procedures performed is to be answered by the courts
in light of the jurisprudence.
The majority opinion reviewed the evolution of the doctrine of informed consent as it has been applied in other states and then determined
that the informed consent form in this case did not meet the requirements
of the Uniform Consent Law and was therefore invalid.' 0 But the court
then declared that, "the physician ought not be cast in damages in a case
in which it would have been unreasonable to withhold an informed consent for treatment.".... The court concluded that, since the plaintiff failed
to meet the burden of proof of causation (i.e., since the damages from
the vesico-vaginal fistula were not caused by the failure to obtain an informed consent), she could not recover damages.' 62 The court, in determining the questions of damages and causation, cited the Canterbury63
and Zeno'" decisions and declared:
Lack of valid consent gives rise to an action for damages. In

159. 434 So. 2d at 1042. The idea that the Uniform Consent Law is a mere evidentiary
rule and not substantive law is not new. When the statute was passed during the medical
malpractice "crisis" in the mid-1970's physicians were looking for a consent formula to
follow so that they would not be sued. But the theory behind consent is (1) that the patient
has the right of control over his own body and, therefore, over medical treatment and
(2) that he must understand the nature of the treatment before he can consent and assume
the risk of the treatment. Therefore, the information required by the consent statute should
be more than a chart or formula given by the physician for his own protection. Instead,
the required information should be conveyed to the patient so that he fully understands
the information given to him. The "acknowledgment" and "answering the questions of
the patient" requirements in the statute are consistent with this interpretation. See also Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54 (Anderson 1915); cf. Idaho Code § 39.4304 (1976); Iowa Code
Ann. § 147.137 (West 1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41AI00 (1975). All are virtually identical
to the Louisiana Uniform Consent Law. Ohio additionally requires that the consent be comprehended by the patient in English or whatever language in which the consent is written.
160. Id. at 1048.
161. Id.at 1049.
162. Id.
163. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790.
164. Zeno v. Lincoln General Hosp., 404 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981)
(not treating the duty issue, but deciding that if a prudent person would have consented
to surgery rather than getting cancer or septicemia, the lack of informed consent is not
actionable).
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Louisiana, however, only compensatory damages can be recovered.
The defendant can only be cast for those damages caused by the
breach of duty. This element, in the jurisprudence, has been referred to as the "causation" element. Not only must the plaintiff
show that the undisclosed risk actually occurred, but the plaintiff
must also prove that if the risk had been disclosed, the treatment
and the unwanted consequences would have been avoided. The
plaintiff must prove that the failure to inform caused the damaging consequences. If the plaintiff would have undertaken the treatment in any event, in spite of the deficient "informed consent,"
there could be no recovery. '
The court stated that the theory of informed consent in Louisiana
is founded on the basic premise that the patient, not the physician, should
determine what is to be done to his body.' 66 Although the patient has
an undisputed right to receive information that will enable him to make
a treatment choice, the decision as to what information is material'" 7 is
an objective judgment which should be made by the jury based upon
"what a reasonable patient would do under these circumstances" rather
than a subjective standard' 68 which would take into consideration the individual's needs and would require the jury to determine what this person wanted. 6 9 The patient's burden of proof under LaCaze is that he
must establish that he was not informed of the material risks, and that
a reasonable person would not have consented to the operation if he would
have known of those risks. Under this standard, the patient is relieved
of the burden of producing medical testimony to determine what a
reasonable prudent physician would have done (i.e., the professional standard of causation)' 76 because the jury can decide the issue from lay
testimony to determine "what a reasonable patient would have done under
the circumstances." This is the objective or reasonable man test for causation set forth in Canterbury and now adopted by the LaCaze court.''
The Lacaze court recognized that an allegation of informed consent
has traditionally sounded in negligence and required the plaintiff to prove
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.' 72 The Lacaze court rejected, however, the professional standard of care formulated in Karp
165. LaCaze, 434 So. 2d at 1048.
166. LaCaze, 434 So. 2d at 1043 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosps.,
211 N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93).
167. 434 So. 2d at 1046 ("Materiality is, in essence, the product of the risk and its
chance of occurring.").
168. The LaCaze court applied the objective standard of reasonableness rather than the
subjective standard, thereby vitiating the individual's freedom of choice by substituting for
it the standard of what a reasonable patient would have done.
169. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
170. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d at 423.
171. LaCaze, 434 So. 2d at 1048.
172. Id. at 1044.
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v. Cooley,' 3 which bases the physician's duty to disclose on medical
custom and practice, and stated that the entirety of the physician's duty
to provide his patient with information under the doctrine of informed
consent is subsumed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40.1'" The opinion continued: "R.S. 40:1299.40 has, therefore, superseded in Louisiana,
the jurisprudential rules defining 'consent to medical treatment'. A patient's consent to treatment must be measured by the standards contained
in Subsection A or Subsection C of the statute."' 75 The effect of this
step, since the statute does not require that the patient be informed of
alternative forms of treatment, is to exclude any duty on the part of the
physician to suggest alternative therapy in the informed consent document.
Justice Blanche, in his concurring opinion,' 76 stated that the view that
R.S. 40:1299.40 supersedes the jurisprudential standards for informed consent is incorrect. He characterized the jurisprudence as imposing
an affirmative duty on the physician to provide his patient with
sufficient information to enable that patient to intelligently decide,
by balancing probable risks against probable benefits, whether to
undergo the proposed treatment, select an alternative process, or
refuse treatment altogether. Accordingly, the information typically
required to be disclosed included the proposed diagnostic,
therapeutic or surgical procedures contemplated, the material risks
involved, and the alternatives available, if any.'
Justice Blanche argued that the statute was intended to provide physicians with the protection of an evidentiary rule creating a presumption
of valid consent and was not intended to create a cause of action against
physicians for failure to comply with its disclosure requirements. Furthermore, Subsections A and B of the statute, when read together, are rules
of evidence and do not purport to confer substantive rights to the patient
nor do they purport to be the exclusive means for obtaining a valid
consent.
In short, the majority's position that the Uniform Consent Law
supersedes the prior jurisprudence on informed consent is simply
not supported by a careful reading of the statute. The
jurisprudence is superseded only in the sense that now a valid
consent may be obtained 'notwithstanding' the jurisprudence. The
opposite is not true, i.e. that an invalid consent is obtained if
the statute is not complied with. By its express provisions, the

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
1stCir.

493 F.2d at 423.
434 So. 2d at 1046.
Id.
Id.at 1050 (Blanche, J., concurring).
Id.(citing Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289 (La. App.
1977)).
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Uniform Consent Law deals only with valid consents, not invalid
ones. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that compliance
with the statute is the exclusive means of obtaining a valid
consent. 'I
Justice Blanche would also allow the physician the option of utilizing the
"therapeutic privilege" of not informing the patient of some information
which, in the physician's professional opinion, would be harmful for the
patient to know.' 79
Justice Dennis, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's construction of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 as a comprehensive restatement of the informed consent doctrine, and argued that future
cases falling outside the confines of the present statute should continue
to be governed by the jurisprudence.' He noted that the statute "satisfies
only one duty of the physician to his patient during the course of treatment and does not supplant his obligation to fulfill his other duties contemplated by the doctrine of informed consent.""' Some of the other
duties which Justice Dennis stated might be required of the physician in
fulfilling "his basic duty of due care" would be "to inform his patient
of an alternative treatment promising greater benefit than that being pursued, to alert him of a bodily abnormality, or to apprise him of an ail,,182
ment's lack of response to treatment ....
Impact and Critique of Pizzalotto and LaCaze
In Pizzalotto, the court recognized that the elements necessary to the
cause of action for lack of consent are the same as those in battery.' 83
Therefore, an attorney should plead the battery theory of recovery: (1)
when the physician fails to obtain any consent to perform an operation,
or (2) when the physician obtains consent to perform an operation, but
either exceeds the scope of the consent, misrepresents the severity of the
operation, or performs an operation of a substantially different nature.
Under the battery theory, the burden of proof is not as onerous as in
an action for lack of informed consent because the plaintiff only has to
show that the operation was performed without his consent. This criterion
is satisfied where the patient either never consented to medical treatment
or where consent to medical treatment was vitiated by an inadequate
disclosure. This writer agrees with the majority opinion's application of
the battery theory of recovery to these situations.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1052.
437 So. 2d 869 (Dennis, J., concurring).
Id. at 870.
Id.
437 So. 2d at 862.
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In LaCaze, the court held that the Uniform Consent Law superseded
the prior informed consent jurisprudence. It recognized that the patient's
understanding of the risks and treatment is necessary before a valid informed consent can be given. The court then applied the objective
(reasonable man) test as the standard of patient understanding. The physician's duty is to comply with the requirements of Subsections A and C
of the statute. 8 " Subsection A requires the physician to inform the patient in writing of the following information: (1) the surgical procedure
or course of procedures to be followed as well as the purpose of the procedure; (2) the risks, if' any, associated with the particular procedure to
be performed; and (3) the risks, if any, of death, brain death, quadriplegia,
paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limbs, and disfiguring scars. Subsection A also requires the physician to obtain an
acknowledgement from the patient that disclosure of the information listed
above has been made, and that all questions which the patient has asked
have been answered satisfactorily. The consent form then must be signed
by the patient or someone who has legal authority to consent on his behalf.
If these requirements have been met without a misrepresentation of
material fact, then the consent is presumed to be valid and effective, and
the physician's duty regarding consent is presumed to be fulfilled.
If, however, the informed consent is not reduced to writing, Subsection C of the statute would allow the consent to be valid if the physician
can prove that all the other requirements in Subsection A have been met.
At trial it would be the physician's word against the patient's.
If the statutory guidelines of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40
are met, the question remains whether the physician has fulfilled his duty
to the patient with regard to informed consent even though additional
duties are imposed by the jurisprudence. These duties include informing
the patient of alternative forms of therapy, or referring him to a specialist
or another medical facility where more sophisticated equipment is available
for diagnosis and treatment. This writer agrees with Justices Blanche and
Dennis in their concurring opinions in LaCaze'85 in which they argue that
compliance with the Uniform Consent Law is neither the exclusive means
of obtaining a valid consent nor, necessarily, fulfillment of the physician's
duties under the doctrine of informed consent. Additionally, the physician still has an affirmative duty to the patient to insure that he receives
the best available treatment and care. Failure of the physician to consider
all medical benefits and risks of treatment and then disclose them to the
patient might not be a breach of the statutory duty of informed consent,
but arguably it would still be a deviation from the accepted standard of
medical care and, therefore, constitutes medical negligence on the part

184. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977).
185. 434 So. 2d at 1050 (Blanche, J., concurring); 437 So. 2d 869 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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of the health care provider." 6 The doctrine of informed consent should
change the medical decision-making process from a consensual one, in
which the physician obtains the acquiescence of the patient, to a participatory one, in which the patient plays an active role. The patient's
participation in the process should include considering information,
weighing alternative courses of treatment, balancing medical risks against
benefits, and considering the financial costs of treatment.
The guidelines suggested by the LaCaze court, its interpretation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 and its requirements for a valid
informed consent provide substantial guidance to the physician as to what
and how much to say to the patient. However, since LaCaze adopted
the objective standard of causation, the question of whether a particular
patient would have refused medical treatment is irrelevant because the
objective standard allows the admission at the trial of only that evidence
probative of whether a reasonable patient would have accepted the treatment. If the patient does have the right to do with his body as he wishes' 87
and if the patient even has the right to refuse medical treatment and die,' 88
then the LaCaze court was inconsistent in adopting the objective test which
disregards the patient's right of self-determination and requires that his
decision be "reasonable." Additionally, the LaCaze objective standard
of causation deprives the jury of its traditional function of assessing the
plaintiff's credibility under oath when he testifies that his decision to
undergo treatment would have been different if he had been aware of
the risks involved. Since the physician knows that the patient is held to
an objective standard of disclosure, then, to avoid civil liability, he need
not disclose any more information to the patient than would be required
to cause a "reasonable person" to undergo treatment. Information of
unique significance to the patient's decision may thus be denied the patient, while the physician escapes liability because the jury will be denied
the opportunity to hear the testimony of the patient's desires and wishes.
Instead, the jury will hear expert medical testimony from physicians who
will tell them how a reasonable patient would have reacted under the circumstances. Under the subjective test, the physician and the patient would
both be allowed to testify. The physician would.tell the jury what he told
the patient, then the patient would tell the jury whether he would have
refused the treatment or if he understood the physician's explanation. The
jury would then be given the opportunity to assess the credibility of both

186. See generally Baudry & Wiener, Preoperative Preparation of the Surgical Patient,
63 Surgery 885 (1968); Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 349, 413-14 (1974); Rockwell & Pepitone-Rockwell, The
Emotional Impact of Surgery and the Value of Informed Consent, 63 Medical Clinics N.
Am. 1341 (1979).
187. 434 So. 2d at 1043; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
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witnesses. If the subjective standard of disclosure were adopted in Louisiana, then physicians would have to establish a dialogue with each of
their patients. To insure that he meets the individual's needs for information, the physician would have to follow a set of disclosure checklists
or guidelines for each patient.
LaCaze's effect on patients' participation in the medical decisionmaking process is not limited to its imposition of the objective or
reasonable man standard of disclosure. In LaCaze, the court also adverted
to the physician's right to exercise the "therapeutic privilege."'' 9 The physician's invocation of the "therapeutic privilege" is, of course, subject to
judicial scrutiny. But the question of whether the patient was so ill or
distraught that the disclosure would have been hazardous to him is primarily a medical question, and the physician defending the earlier decision
not to disclose risk information can usually sway the jury by introducing
an impressive group of experts to agree with the defendant's position.
Therefore, although Pizzalotto and LaCaze do answer some of the questions which attorneys and physicians have had about the doctrines of lack
of consent and lack of informed consent, the LaCaze court's adoption
of the "objective reasonable man view" and its favorable reference to
the physician's "therapeutic privilege" in informed consent cases have
vitiated the patient's right to determine his fate over his body and life. 9
On the other hand, the subjective standard of disclosure recognizes the
patient's rights and should, therefore, be adopted either judicially or
legislatively.
Liberative Prescriptionfor Patient Consent and Other Consent Statutes
Gunter v. Plauche involved a malpractice cause of action in which
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently performed two operations on his knee. In Gunter's petition he alleged that he was operated
on by Dr. Plauche on July 1, 1976 and September 7, 1977 and that both
operations were unsuccessfully and negligently performed. On August 31,
1978 Mr. Gunter filed suit and on September 4, 1980 (with the leave of
court), filed a "supplemental and amending petition" alleging that the
treatment and two operations were performed without the defendant's properly informing him of alternatives to and risks of the treatment
performed.' 9' The trial court directed a verdict against Gunter, but the
court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court held that reasonable
jurors might conclude that Gunter was denied the right to informed

189.

434 So. 2d at 1045.

190. Id. at 1043 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125,
129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
191. 439 So. 2d at 438.
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consent. 92 At the second trial the jury held for the defendant on the issue
of negligence but granted damages of $175,000 on Gunter's informed consent claim.
During the course of the second trial, the defendant filed a peremptory exception of prescription as to the original petition and, in the alternative, as to the amending petition. After the verdict was rendered, the
trial judge refused to sign the judgment and set a hearing on the exception. The judge maintained the exception and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
The court of appeal affirmed' 93 and the Louisiana Supreme Court granted
certiorari 9 ' to review the lower court's judgment.
The supreme court, through Justice Pro Tern. Bailes, reasoned that
the amended claim for the breach of duty by the physician in failing to
obtain an informed consent to medical treatment was governed by the
standards set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40 and cited
LaCaze with approval.' 9 5 The court acknowledged that the informed consent claim is different from the claim for the negligent performance of
surgery. However, the court held that since the facts of the informed consent arose from the same medical negligence action, the defendant received
sufficient notice to interrupt prescription for the negligence cause of action which was filed within the one year prescriptive period. Since the
original petition was filed timely, the amendment to the pleading was also
timely; therefore, the trial court erred in sustaining the defendant's exception of prescription.' 96 According to plaintiff's attorney, Gunter settled in February of 1984 for $260,000. Justice Blanche dissented on the
grounds that the "lack of informed consent to surgery and negligence
in the performance of surgery are two entirely different causes of action
filing of suit on one would
arising out of two separate events, and the
97
not constitute fair notice of the other."'
One of the problems physicians sometimes encounter in obtaining an
informed consent from a patient involves the capacity of the patient to
give an informed consent. The question of who can consent to treatment
for whom is clearly indicated in Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.53.
The statute indicates that a consent can be given by any adult, for himself;
any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child; any married person, whether an adult or a minor, for himself, and for his spouse;

192.
193.
194.
195.
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1984).
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197.

Gunter v. Plauche, 399 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
Gunter v. Plauche, 428 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
Gunter v. Plauche, 434 So. 2d 1099 (La. 1983).
439 So. 2d 437, 440. Another case citing LaCaze and the causation test for inconsent is Doss v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 448 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 2d Cir.
Id.at 441.
Id.
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any person temporarily standing in loco parentis whether formally serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his ward;
any female regardless of age or marital status, for herself when given
in connection with pregnancy-or childbirth; and in the absence of a parent,
any adult, for his minor brother or sister; in the absence of a parent,
any grandparent for his minor grandchild. In addition to this statute and
'
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.55, 98
two Attorney General's opinions
state that minors are allowed to give consent for themselves when none
of the authorized persons of legal age are available.' 9 9 In emergency situations, a consent may be implied under Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.54.200

Information Which Physicians Should Convey to Encourage Patients to
Participate in the Medical Decision-Making Process
Even if the physician follows the statutory and jurisprudential standards, he apparently has little guarantee that the patient understands and
remembers what the physician has told him. One study revealed that even
when "risk information" was presented in a concise, intelligible manner,
patients averaged only a seventy percent rate of comprehension."' Another
study revealed that even when patients fully understand the information
concerning their medical treatment, they are frequently unable to remember
that information for any significant period of time. 202 Tape recording the
198. La. R.S. 40:1299.55 (1977) ("Any person acting in good faith shall be justified
in relying on the representations of any person purporting to give such a consent, including,
but not limited to his identity, his age, his marital status, his emancipation, and his relationship to any other person for whom the consent is purportedly given.").
199. 1975 La. Op. Att'y Gen. 1740 (Jan. 22, 1976) (allowing minors to consent in emergencies); 1979 La. Op. Att'y Gen. 1051 (Sept. 26, 1979) (allowing schools to give consent for
minors in emergencies).
200. See supra note 147. Other informed consent requirements covered by statute, but
which will not be discussed in this article, include blood donations, La. R.S. 40:1097 (1978),
venereal disease treatment, La. R.S. 40:1065.1 (1977), drug abuse treatment, La. R.S. 40:1096
(1977), treatment for the mentally ill and retarded, La. R.S. 40:1299.58 (1978), sterilization
and abortions, La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5 & 1299.35.6 (1981), and parental care of infants, La.
R.S. 40:1299.36.2 (1982). Consent under these special circumstances is regulated by specific
statutes rather than by the general guidelines regulating consent and informed consent. See
La. R.S. 40:1299.36.2 (1982) (governing parental refusal to give consent for care and treatment of minors).
201. Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or Substance, 123 Archives
Internal Medicine 682, 684 (1969) (reporting that subjects who read the short form of a
protocol exhibited a recall rate of 700o and those who read the longer version only remembered
35%).
202. Robinson & Merav, Informed Consent: Recall by Patients Tested Postoperatively,
22 Annals Thoracic Surgery 209 (1976) (After a full disclosure of risks to patients undergoing heart surgery, patients were tested 4 to 6 months later for their memory of the elements
of the disclosure. Even with prompting, the average cumulative recall score was only 42%.).
Bailey, Informed Consent, 1978 Legal Medicine Annual 273, cites the Robinson and Merav
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risk information and reviewing it in a number of disclosure sessions would
help the patient better assimilate and recall the information so as to be
able to make an informed choice, particularly if the doctor were to give
the patient a duplicate tape of the sessions.
Unless requirements for a comprehensive, subjective patient standard
can be set forth in a relatively detailed checklist which physicians would
routinely use to brief their patients about surgical or medical procedures,
physicians will continue to lack sufficient guidance to meet the requirements
of an informed consent doctrine which would actively involve both the
patient and physician in the decision-making process. Some organizations
such as the American Hospital Association,2"3 the federal government," '
and the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals" 5 have promulgated guidelines which give physicians and patients some degree of
certainty about whether there has been compliance with the requirements
of informed consent. The statutory requirements that the information
should be in writing and signed by the patient should not hinder the physician from adopting the checklist approach, because that method would
insure that the physician had covered all of the necessary information
for a valid informed consent. In addition, since all of the necessary information would be on the document after the patient signs it, the requirements of the Louisiana informed consent statute would be met and
the informed consent would be presumed to be valid.
It is suggested the physician should use the following checklist in obtaining an informed consent from a patient:
1. The physician should describe, in detail, the proposed treatment
including the actual procedures to be followed in layman's language. The
physician should also explain why the patient's physical condition
necessitates the treatment as well as the relative benefits of the proposed
treatment.
2. The physician should describe all risks of treatment that the patient would consider material, including whether the risks of the procedure
include death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or disfiguring scars; a disclosure of the probable complications; and a description of the risks to be encountered from
study as support for his contention that physicians should, for their own protection, document disclosure sessions by use of tape recorders. Repetition of risk information over a
number of disclosure sessions would serve to strengthen the patient's comprehension of the
treatment and its risks, enabling a strengthening of physiological and psychological defenses
against the approaching stress of treatment.
203. American Hospital Ass'n, A Patient's Bill of Rights (1972).
204. See, e.g., FDA Regulations for New Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 310 (1984); HHS Regulations for Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1983).
205. Joint Comm'n on the Accreditation of Hosps., Accreditation Manual for Hospitals
85 (1983).
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a failure to undergo the proposed treatment. The measure of what risks
to disclose to the patient should be a subjective one based upon the patient's understanding of what he is being told, even though at trial the
court would apply an objective standard. The physician should then
describe the risks which he believes the patient would consider relevant
in deciding whether to undergo treatment, regardless of the importance
that a reasonable person would attach to these risks.
3. The physician should offer to give a more exhaustive disclosure
of risks which would include the more remote risks of treatment. This
guideline insures that the patient will be informed of all the risks that
might be relevant to his or her decision and acts as a check against physician error concerning the degree of disclosure under the pending guideline.
In making the offer of more exhaustive disclosure, the physician should
state the factors which he used in determining which risks to disclose.
4. The physician should describe the potential benefits of the treatment and explain the treatment's efficacy in bringing about these benefits.
5. The physician should describe the alternative methods of treating
the patient's condition, including in the discussion the risks and potential
benefits of those alternatives as well as the relative costs of the treatment.
6. The physician should explain why he thinks the proposed treatment would be more beneficial to the patient than alternative methods
of treatment.
7. The physician should offer to answer any questions the patient
may have concerning the proposed treatment, its risks, or alternatives.
In view of the general reluctance of patients to ask questions, physicians
should make special effort to encourage the patient's inquiries. Specifically,
the physician should offer to answer the patient's questions several times
during the disclosure session, expressly inquiring as to whether the patient has any further questions. For example, he should state, "I am
available to answer questions at any time that you may have about what
I have told you" or ask "Do you have any questions now that I can
answer for you?." In connection with this offer to answer the patient's
question, the physician should also offer to repeat or supplement the relevant risk information at a later time. The patient may not have particular
questions concerning the treatment, but may still desire to hear the relevant information again to assimilate it more fully. The patient should,
therefore, be informed that the physician stands ready to review the information with him if the patient believes that it is necessary, and that
the patient should jot down questions to ask so that he will not forget
them.
8. The physician should ask, and this should be part of the informed
consent in writing, whether or not the patient understands the information conveyed. The questions should be: "Do you understand what I have
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told you?" and "Do you have any other questions about this?" The physician should then write down that the patient has understood the information and whether he asked questions. If the patient did ask questions,
the physician should take note of them and of his answers to them.
Therefore, when the patient signs he will read and be reminded of the
informed consent, he then will review "that he did not have any questions or that his questions were answered" and either ask the questions
at that time or by his silence and signature agree to the statement.
9. The physician should inform the patient that he has the right to
refuse treatment or to choose one of the alternatives which have been
discussed at the session. The physician should convey his willingness to
perform any alternative treatment that the patient chooses, or to help the
patient find a specialist qualified to perform the chosen alternative. Compliance with this guideline should alert the patient to his full freedom
to choose one of the alternatives discussed at the session, without having
to rely solely upon his resources in locating a physician willing to perform the preferred alternative.
10. The patient should be informed of the right to withdraw consent at any time before the procedure or, if circumstances permit, during
the course of treatment.
11. The physician should inform the patient of the risks of not taking a diagnostic test or of refusing treatment. For instance, if a physician
recommends a pap smear test and the patient refuses, the physician should
tell the patient that by refusing the test to detect cancer, 0 6 an undetected
case of cancer might kill her.
12. Although not a requirement for a patient's consent, the physician should document the amount of time spent with the patient, and
the number of sessions in which he discussed the consent considerations.
He could even tape record the disclosure sessions and give the patient
a duplicate of the tape. This would allow the patient to review the tape
under less stressful conditions and enable him to consider his options in
a more objective frame of mind.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Louisiana in LaCaze v. Collier, Pizzalotto v.
Wilson, and Gunter v. Plauche has determined that an action for lack
of informed consent sounds in negligence, that an action for lack of consent sounds in the intentional tort of battery, and that both causes of
action are separate from traditional medical malpractice or negligence
causes of action. Under a negligence cause of action for lack of informed

206.

See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
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consent, the patient must prove that the doctor failed to disclose statutorilyrequired information regarding the proposed treatment, that the procedure
caused the injury, and that a reasonable person in the patient's situation
would not have undergone the procedure had he been fully informed.
Under a battery cause of action for lack of consent, the patient must
prove only that the physician operated without procuring an "informed
consent" and that the procedure caused the injury. Generally, when a
patient suffers a bad result and cannot prove that the physician was
negligent, if he is able to show that the informed consent does not follow
the guidelines of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.40, then not only
will the informed consent allegation fortify a weak case, it may guarantee
that the case will reach the jury. Judges, in deciding such cases, should
carefully separate these issues at trial, because the cause of action for
lack of consent or lack of informed consent arises from the risk of harm
in a non-negligently performed medical procedure or treatment. Generally in such cases, the surgery was done correctly with the results being
exactly as the doctor expected. It is the patient who did not desire or
expect the results obtained, and from that unexpected result is born the
dissatisfaction which gives rise to many a medical malpractice lawsuit.
Although informed consent is a very lethal weapon in the plaintiff's arsenal
and the informed consent doctrine seems to greatly favor the patient's
rights, the Louisiana Supreme Couit's use of the objective standard of
what a reasonable patient would have done under the circumstances in
determining causation, instead of using the subjective standard, does not
recognize the individual patient's right to exercise complete control over
his medical destiny.

